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CEASE AND DESIST: FINDING AN 
EQUITABLE SOLUTION IN TRADEMARK 
DISPUTES BETWEEN HIGH SCHOOLS  
AND COLLEGES 
Abstract: In 2010, Florida State University told Southeast High School in 
Bradenton, Florida that they could no longer use the “Seminoles” nick-
name and logos that the schools have both been using for over fifty years. 
Unlike many trademark disputes between collegiate institutions and high 
schools though, Southeast High School refused to “cease and desist” 
claiming that they were not infringing on Florida State’s trademarks. 
Eventually, the case settled before litigation, but the University’s assertion 
of trademark rights against a high school in the same state highlights a 
growing trend of aggressive trademark protection by collegiate institu-
tions. This Note discusses the development of trademark law with relation 
to universities, examines the rise of the collegiate merchandising right, 
and analyzes trademark disputes between high schools and colleges and 
how a court would likely rule on such a dispute. 
Introduction 
 In the summer of 2010, the relationship between Florida State 
University and Southeast High School became national news when the 
University threatened to file suit against the high school over alleged 
trademark infringement.1 Despite decades of cooperation between the 
schools, Florida State asserted that the high school was infringing on 
the University’s trademarked “Seminole” logo.2 The resulting media 
coverage brought the recent proliferation of trademark disputes be-
tween high schools and colleges into the spotlight.3 Unlike many of 
these disputes, however, in this case, Southeast High School chose to 
fight back, asserting that they had just as much a right to the Seminole 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Adam Himmelsbach, Colleges Tell High Schools Logos Are Off Limits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
27, 2010, at A1; see also Anthony Cormier, It’s an Awesome Logo. Now Change It., Sarasota 
Herald-Trib., Aug. 26, 2010, at A1. 
2 See Editorial, Seminole War and Peace, Sarasota Herald-Trib., Aug. 27, 2010, at A12. 
Southeast High School has routinely sent its top students and student athletes to Florida 
State, including a former two-time all-American football player, Peter Warrick. See id. 
3 See Himmelsbach, supra note 1, at A1 (discussing specific instances of trademark dis-
putes between high schools and colleges that have recently emerged). 
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logo as Florida State.4 Ultimately, the stance was effective; Florida State 
settled with Southeast, allowing the high school to continue using the 
Seminole logo at a reasonable cost.5 
 Although these disputes often generate negative press, it is not 
unusual for a collegiate institution to assert its trademark rights against 
a high school through a Cease and Desist Letter (“C&D letter”).6 Typi-
cally, a C&D letter asserts that the sender of the letter owns a trade-
mark, and that the receiver is violating the rights of that trademark; fur-
ther, the letter sets forth the legal claims being made.7 Additionally, the 
letter asks that the offending institution terminate usage of all trade-
marks claimed by the owner.8 Often, the collegiate institution claims 
that failure to protect against potential infringement could result in the 
loss of their trademark.9 
 Upon receiving a C&D letter, a high school is often forced to de-
cide between termination or litigation.10 On the one hand, termina-
tion, although not inexpensive, provides cost-certainty and the assur-
ance of finality.11 On the other hand, the uncertainty in cost, duration, 
and finality of litigation often forces a high school to abandon any 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Himmelsbach, supra note 1, at A1; see also Anthony Cormier, Southeast Seminoles 
Standing Fast, Sarasota Herald-Trib., Aug. 27, 2010, at BN3 (reporting that Southeast 
High School would not change their logo despite the insistence of Florida State and the 
Collegiate Licensing Company that the high school’s logo was infringing on federally and 
state protected trademarks). 
5 See Alan Dell, Southeast, FSU Reach Deal on Noles Logo, Bradenton Herald (Nov. 13, 
2010), http://www.bradenton.com/2010/11/13/2735256/southeast-fsu-reach-deal-on-noles. 
html (reporting the final agreement between the two schools). 
6 See Himmelsbach, supra note 1, at A1; see also Letter from Univ. of Iowa to Murietta 
Valley High Sch. (Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Iowa Letter], available at http://www.pe. 
com/multimedia/pdf/2010/20101119_slogo.pdf. 
7 See Deborah A. Wilcox, Resist Cease and Desist, Bus. L. Today, June 15, 2006, at 27. 
8 See id.; see also Iowa Letter, supra note 6 (asking Murietta Valley High School to termi-
nate use of the asserted trademarks). 
9 See Iowa Letter, supra note 6 (discussing the fear of losing a trademark as a reason for 
the letter); see also Jim Halley, High Schools Cash in on Logos, Clash with Colleges, USA Today 
(Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.highschoolsports.net/sports/preps/2010–12–06-high-school-
logos-trademark_N.htm (discussing the increasing frequency of these disputes). 
10 See Wilcox, supra note 7, at 28–29 (discussing the alternatives upon receiving a C&D 
Letter); see also Cormier, supra note 4, at BN3 (reporting that Southeast High School would 
rather take their chances in litigation than stop using the Seminoles logo). 
11 See Himmelsbach, supra note 1, at A1 (reporting that it would cost Glades Day High 
School in Florida over 60,000 dollars to change their logos); see also School to Stop Using 
Dodge-Like Ram’s Head Logo, npr (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=123781334 [hereinafter Block Interview] (transcript of interview by 
Melissa Block with Michael Kotki, Principal of Lake Mary’s High School) (estimating the 
cost of replacing a gymnasium floor at 15,000 dollars because the floor had a disputed logo 
in the center). 
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claims to the trademark at question.12 Furthermore, a collegiate institu-
tion has very little to lose in asserting trademark rights against a high 
school, and the high school has little to gain in a lawsuit other than 
continuing to use that mark.13 In these disputes, a university can gain 
acknowledgement and demonstrated control of trademark rights, whe-
reas the best case for a high school is to maintain the status quo—using 
the logos, nicknames, and other identifying insignias at no cost.14 
 The practical consequence of this unequal bargaining power be-
tween collegiate institutions and high schools is that both parties pre-
sume that the collegiate institutions are correct in asserting their 
trademark rights, and that the high schools are infringing on those 
rights.15 This prevalent presumption, however, has never been validated 
in court.16 Despite significant successes against small businesses, colle-
giate institutions have never litigated a trademark dispute against a 
high school defendant.17 Applying the standards that most Courts use 
in analyzing trademark disputes, it is less than clear that a collegiate 
institution could prevail against a high school defendant in such a 
suit.18 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Tom Abrahams, Local High School Forced to Change Logo in Dispute with University, KTRK-
TV ( July 13, 2007), http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/local&id=5478603 (re-
porting that Woodlands High School changed their logo to avoid further action from the 
University of Wisconsin). 
13 See Dennis Read, Is Your Logo Safe?, Athletic Mgmt. (Aug./Sept. 2005), 
http://www.momentummedia.com/articles/am/am1705/logo.htm (discussing the poten-
tial risks for high schools in using marks that universities claim are protected by federal 
trademark law). Although a university stands to gain the acknowledgement and demon-
strated control of trademark rights, a high school’s best case scenario is maintaining their 
status quo by not paying anything to the university and keeping their logos, nicknames, 
and other indentifying insignias. See id. 
14 See id. 
15 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
Yale L.J. 882, 907–27 (2007) (discussing the presumption of rights in trademark disputes 
for the senior user and the eventual acceptance by the junior user regardless of legal doc-
trine). 
16 Halley, supra note 9 (reporting that there is no known instance of a trademark dis-
pute between high schools and colleges being decided in court). 
17 See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 625, 632–42 
(discussing the expansion of trademark rights as a result of the continued assertion by 
trademark owners); see also Halley, supra note 9 (quoting an industry expert who notes that 
these disputes have never actually been litigated). 
18 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (describ-
ing eight separate factors that the court used in analyzing a trademark dispute); see also 
Cormier, supra note 4, at BN3 (reporting that local legal experts feel that the high school 
could prevail if the case ended up in court, and noting that Florida State was more cordial 
after the high school decided to fight back). 
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 This Note analyzes trademark disputes between colleges and high 
schools and argues that, to create equitable settlements that benefit 
both parties, there should not be a presumption favoring collegiate in-
stitutions.19 Part I provides an introduction to trademark law, and fo-
cuses specifically on how courts analyze trademark disputes.20 Part II 
discusses the link between the increased popularity of collegiate athlet-
ics and the rise of collegiate trademark rights.21 Part III highlights the 
positive case law that has fueled a quarter-century of expansion and 
assertion of collegiate trademark rights.22 Part IV then uses the often 
cited Polaroid factors to analyze a dispute between a high school and 
college, and argues that collegiate institutions may be asserting more 
rights than they could actually claim against a high school defendant.23 
Finally, Part V argues that since the outcome of a lawsuit is unclear, 
both collegiate institutions and high schools should rethink their posi-
tions, and this Note ultimately proposes a uniform settlement that 
would benefit both collegiate institutions and high schools.24 
I. The Beginning of Collegiate Trademark Protection 
 The primary purpose of trademark law is to protect consumers 
from confusion as to the origin and source of goods in the market-
place.25 Unlike a patent or copyright, trademark rights only arise when 
a protected mark is used in connection with the sale of goods and ser-
vices and the public recognizes those marks as establishing the origin of 
those goods and services.26 For this reason, collegiate trademark rights 
are directly tied to the increased popularity of collegiate athletics and 
the subsequent increase in merchandising and other revenue streams 
for universities.27 After collegiate institutions realized the consumer 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Gibson, supra note 15, at 919–20 (arguing that trademark users should not as-
sume a presumption of rights by another party solely based on the actions of other users in 
similarly situated circumstances); see also infra notes 25–273 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 25–86 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 87–123 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 124–156 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 157–228 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 229–273 and accompanying text. 
25 See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§§ 2.1–.2 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing the primary purpose of general trademark protection 
and the effect of the Federal Trademark Act of 1946). 
26 See Mary LaFrance, Understanding Trademark Law § 1.01 (2d ed. 2009). 
27 See Jack Revoyr, Non-definitive History of Collegiate Licensing, 88 Trademark Rep. 370, 
378–80 (1998) (noting that colleges were unsure to what extent they were even allowed to 
protect their name much less other indentifying marks before the explosion of the market 
for college merchandise). 
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market for official merchandise and apparel, universities moved to pro-
tect their nicknames, logos, and other emblems to receive legal protec-
tion from potential competitors.28 Over the past quarter-century, col-
leges and universities have discovered that through control of their own 
trademark rights they can gain exclusive rights that allow them to con-
trol most if not all merchandise associated with their marks to create 
significant revenue.29 This Part explores the basis for collegiate institu-
tions’ trademark protection, the establishment of trademarks, and po-
tential causes of actions for trademark infringement.30 
A. The Lanham Act and Federal Trademark Protection 
 Before 1946, trademark protection was provided by a patchwork of 
state law and federal statutes, which created “judicial obscurity,” result-
ing in a muddled framework for decisions concerning the rights of 
trademark owners.31 That obscurity, along with an increasing nationali-
zation of the American economy, led Congress to conclude that the de-
velopment of common law on a state-by-state basis no longer adequately 
protected consumers and producers.32 The resulting legislation was the 
Federal Trademark Act of 1946, more commonly known as the Lanham 
Act.33 
 The Lanham Act provides the federal basis for collegiate institu-
tions’ assertion of trademark rights.34 The Lanham Act not only 
adopted most common law elements of trademark protection at the 
time, it also expanded and extended the rights of trademark owners by 
adding new elements to further protect against unfair competition.35 
Consequently, collegiate institutions, most notably those with nationally 
                                                                                                                      
28 See id. at 385–87 (analyzing the confusion and divergence in strategies in registering 
different names and marks amongst collegiate institutions). 
29 See id.; see also infra notes 87–123 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 31–86 and accompanying text. 
31 See 1 McCarthy, supra note 25, § 5.4 (quoting the Senate Committee on Patents ar-
gument that new legislation was needed to provide a comprehensive federal scheme to 
ensure efficient resolutions of trademark infringement cases). 
32 See id. (noting the Congressional intent to place all substantive law regarding trade-
marks into one statute to combat rising concerns over fraud and misrepresentation of 
goods to consumers and the misallocation of goodwill to producers). 
33 See Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
34 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1127 (2006); see also John Grady & Steve McKelvey, Trademark 
Protection of School Colors: Smack Apparel and Sinks Decisions Trigger Color-ful Legal Debate for 
the Collegiate Licensing Industry, 18 J. Legal Aspects Sport 207, 211 (2008). 
35 See Restatement of Unfair Competition (Third) § 9(e) (1995) (clarifying the 
purposes and innovations of the Lanham Act when it was passed). 
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recognized athletic programs, are now able to use both state and federal 
protection to prevent infringement.36 
                                                                                                                     
 The Lanham Act has evolved into a comprehensive body of federal 
trademark law.37 The Act defines a trademark as “any word, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof” that is used by the owner of 
the mark to distinguish the owner’s goods in the marketplace.38 Since 
the Act’s passage, judicial interpretation has extended the definition of 
trademarks to include brand names, shapes, and even color schemes.39 
This expansion has been even more significant in the protection of col-
legiate trademarks and licensing rights; almost all decisions have been 
in favor of universities.40 Although the intended purpose of the Act was 
to protect both buyers and sellers from misrepresentation and fraud, 
the effective results were to implement a comprehensive national 
trademark policy and establish a federal cause of action for trademark 
infringement.41 
 In interpreting the Lanham Act, courts have recognized that 
trademarks serve three important, protection-worthy functions; first, 
they identify and distinguish goods; second, they guarantee the quality 
of all goods related to that particular trademark; and third, they adver-
tise and sell.42 The Lanham Act protects these functions by providing 
trademark owners a cause of action under federal law.43 
B. Establishing Trademark Rights Under the Lanham Act 
 Unlike other intellectual property rights that serve to limit compe-
tition, like patents, trademarks are meant to encourage competition by 
 
36 See Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 209–11 (noting suits brought by college in-
stitutions at both the federal and state level). 
37 See 1 McCarthy, supra note 25, § 5:4. 
38 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Trademark and Unfair Compe-
tition Law 84 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that within these meanings, trademarks can mean 
phrases, brand names, and other terms such as trade dress which includes the colors and 
packaging schemes of certain products). 
39 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 174 (1995) (holding that a 
color may meet all necessary standards to serve as a trademark); see also Univ. of Ga. Ath-
letic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the University of 
Georgia’s mascot, an English Bulldog, helped create a distinctive mark); see also Michael 
Grynberg, The Judicial Role in Trademark Law, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1283, 1283–84 (2011) (noting 
that parts of the Lanham Act require judicial interpretation which has continued to de-
velop trademark law). 
40 See infra notes 126–156 and accompanying text. 
41 See 1 McCarthy, supra note 25, § 5:4 (noting the Congressional concern to protect 
both the public and producers from misrepresentation through deceitful practices). 
42 See id. 
43 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
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allowing a producer to distinguish its goods in the market.44 By distin-
guishing goods, trademarks both encourage the production of quality 
products by the trademark holder and allow the customer to make 
more informed and efficient decisions in the marketplace.45 Accord-
ingly, under the Lanham Act, only an owner using the mark in com-
merce by offering goods or services to the public may establish trade-
mark rights.46 This distinction means that using a mark merely as a 
representation of an organization or as an advertisement is not suffi-
cient to create trademark rights.47 Likewise, this distinction prevented 
collegiate institutions from developing trademark rights until they 
started offering merchandise bearing universities marks.48 
 Section 1052 sets forth the standards required for registering a 
trademark federally.49 For although the Lanham Act provides protec-
tion for state-registered trademarks, federal registration extends trade-
mark owners’ rights by giving the trademark exclusivity throughout the 
U.S. for as long as the mark is being used.50 For collegiate institutions, 
that exclusivity right is the basis of many legal assertions made in the 
letters sent to high schools.51 Furthermore, proof of a federally regis-
tered trademark serves as prima facie evidence of the owner’s exclusive 
right to the mark, thus making it much easier to protect.52 
 Although section 1052 provides a broad standard for what can be 
registered as a trademark, the strength of a mark and the level of pro-
                                                                                                                      
44 See Blake R. Bertagna, Poaching Profits: An Examination of the Ability of a Trademark 
Owner to Recover Infringer’s Profits Under the Lanham Act as Amended in 1999, 16 Tex. Intell. 
Prop. L.J. 257, 261–62 (quoting Congressman Fritz Lanham’s persuasive speech for the 
passage of the Lanham Act by stating that trademarks are “the essence of competition”). 
45 See 1 McCarthy, supra note 25, § 2.3 (discussing the economic theory that trade-
marks help promote efficiency in a free-market economy). 
46 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 2.04 (discussing the distinction between merely using 
a mark during the course of doing business and actually providing good or services that 
are associated with a trademark). 
47 See id. § 2.04 [B][1] (distinguishing activities that do not create trademark rights for 
an owner of a mark merely by using the mark). 
48 See id.; see also infra notes 87–123 and accompanying text (outlining the history and 
rise of the collegiate merchandising and licensing). 
49 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006); see also LaFrance, supra note 26, § 1.05 (noting the 
process that trademarks and service marks are registered through the Principle Register of 
the Patent and Trademark Office). 
50 See Robert Lattinville, Logo Cops: The Law and Business of Collegiate Licensing, 5 Kan. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 81, 82–83 (1996). 
51 See Iowa Letter, supra note 6 (stating that all marks that resemble those that are fed-
erally registered by the university may not be used by other schools even if they are un-
aware that such marks are registered). 
52 15 U.S.C. § 1114; see Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 212 (highlighting the ex-
tended protection that section 1114 gives to a federally registered trademark holder). 
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tection that it receives are based on its distinctiveness.53 To determine 
whether a trademark is distinctive, courts have classified trademarks 
into four categories: arbitrary and fanciful, suggestive, descriptive, and 
generic.54 Trademarks that fall within the first two categories are con-
sidered inherently distinctive and therefore they can be registered with-
out showing a secondary meaning.55 On the other hand, descriptive 
marks are only protectable if they have acquired a secondary meaning, 
or more specifically, “a mental recognition in buyers’ and potential 
buyers’ minds that the products connected with” the trademark are 
from or are associated with the same source.56 
 Whether a trademark has acquired a secondary meaning is an es-
pecially important element in analyzing many universities’ trademark 
claims.57 Many collegiate institutions, such as the University of Iowa or 
Florida State University, use their geographic location or regional origin 
in their trademarks.58 The geographic term, Iowa or Florida, is merely a 
description of where the universities are located, and without a secon-
dary meaning attached to the type of products being offered, the uni-
versities would be unable to register these as trademarks within the Lan-
ham Act.59 Yet, in 1983, in University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, 
Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
found that the University of Pittsburgh had a secondary meaning with 
regards to some products but not necessarily with the goods that were 
                                                                                                                      
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (providing an explanation as to what types of trademarks can be 
registered); see also Lattinville, supra note 50, at 82–83 (discussing what constitutes a dis-
tinctive trademark and the greater protection afforded more distinctive marks); Charles T. 
Munger, Vice-Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, An Informal Talk: Practical Thought About 
Practical Thought ( July 20, 1996), in Poor Charlie’ s Almanack: The Wit and Wisdom 
of Charlie Munger 280–97 (Peter D. Kaufman ed., 3d ed. 2008) (analyzing the rise and 
staying power of Coca-Cola based on the distinctiveness of their trademark). 
54 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(discussing the differences between the four categories of marks and holding that the 
word “Safari” could fit into more than one category depending on what type of product 
the word was describing). 
55 LaFrance, supra note 26, § 2.07[A]. The strongest marks in terms of distinctiveness 
are fanciful or arbitrary marks. Id. § 2.07[A][1]. Nike’s “Swoosh” or the “Clorox” brand are 
both examples of arbitrary marks that use words in common usage that do not have any 
connection to the products they are attached to. Id.; Lattinville, supra note 50, at 83. Sug-
gestive marks are considered less strong than arbitrary but remain distinctive because of 
they do not directly describe the products they are attached. See LaFrance, supra note 26, 
§ 2.07[A] [2]. 
56 See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding 
that a basic element of secondary meaning is the impression in a buyer’s mind). 
57 See Lattinville, supra note 50, at 83–84. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
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being offered.60 As a result, when a university claims trademark in-
fringement, a vital question becomes whether the symbols are used in 
such a way that a consumer would connect the marks to the University.61 
C. Asserting Federal Trademark Protection 
 Originally, if a university established a trademark, it had two fed-
eral causes of action under the Lanham Act.62 The first, under section 
1114, establishes a claim for infringement based on the likelihood of 
confusion due to the defendant’s use of the owner’s registered mark.63 
The second, under section 1125, allows a non-registered trademark 
owner to file an unfair competition suit by establishing that the prohib-
ited activities affect interstate commerce.64 In 1996, Congress amended 
the act to include a third potential cause of action: “anti-dilution.”65 
The purpose of the amendment was to protect trademark owners from 
unauthorized uses of their marks that could potentially devalue their 
marks’ reputation even without the likelihood of confusion.66 In C&D 
letters, collegiate institutions often assert claims both for the likelihood 
of confusion and the potential for dilution.67 
1. Confusion 
 Section 1114 provides the most significant protection for a feder-
ally registered trademark owner by providing a cause of action against 
                                                                                                                      
60 See 566 F. Supp. 711, 717 (W.D. Pa. 1983). 
Although there may be some evidence in the record which would tend to 
suggest that the Pitt insignia [has] taken on a secondary meaning for the pro-
vision of educational and athletic services, there is simply no evidence that 
the Pitt insignia ever have had a secondary meaning for soft goods. 
Id. The Court highlighted that the University of Pittsburgh had not previously produced 
goods in the marketplace bearing the trademarked symbols and therefore merchandise 
like tee shirts had yet to develop a reputation in the marketplace. See id. at 717–19. 
61 See Lattinville, supra note 50, at 83–84. 
62 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006) (establishing a cause of action for unfair competi-
tion and a cause of action for reproduction of goods where such use of the trademark is 
likely to deceive). 
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
64 See id. § 1125; see also Latinville, supra note 50, at 84. 
65 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 
985, 985 (1996); see also LaFrance, supra note 26, § 1.05[B][1] (discussing the enactment 
of the Dilution Doctrine under the 1996 Amendment to the Lanham Act). 
66 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
67 See Iowa Letter, supra note 6 (noting that trademark owners must protect against di-
lution). 
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any person who, without the owner’s consent, uses a registered trade-
mark in any way that is likely to cause confusion.68 Courts, when assess-
ing a trademark infringement claim use a two-step analysis: first, a 
plaintiff must establish a valid and enforceable trademark, and second, 
the plaintiff must show that the mark was used in a way that is likely to 
confuse consumers as to the source of the products.69 
 To determine whether a defendant’s use of a registered mark is 
likely to cause confusion, courts have developed various multi-factor 
tests.70 For example, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, the court considers eight independent factors.71 Known familiarly 
as the Polaroid factors, these eight elements include: (1) strength of sen-
ior mark, (2) similarity of marks, (3) proximity of parties, (4) likelihood 
prior owner “will bridge the gap,” (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) 
intent of the defendant, (7) quality of the defendant’s product, and (8) 
buyer’s sophistication.72 The factors are all weighed in assessing whether 
the defendant infringed upon the plaintiff’s trademark rights.73 As re-
sult of the Polaroid factors and similar intricate balancing tests, cases in-
volving trademark infringement are highly fact specific.74 
 Similarly, section 1125 authorizes a non-registered trademark owner 
to bring an unfair competition claim against any person that uses a 
mark intended to deceive or would likely cause confusion to a con-
sumer about the source of the goods.75 Like the multi-factor test used 
in registered trademark cases, courts have required four major ele-
                                                                                                                      
68 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006). 
69 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark. v. Prof’l Therapy Servs. (Razorback), 873 F. 
Supp. 1280, 1291 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (holding that a clinic using the “Razorback” nickname 
infringed on the University of Arkansas’s trademark rights); LaFrance, supra note 26, 
§ 3.02 (discussing the two-step analysis related to confusion under § 1114 of the Lanham 
Act). 
70 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2] (establishing that courts both at the state 
and federal level have developed similar tests to determine the likelihood of confusion); 
see also Razorback, 873 F. Supp. at 1283–92 (discussing the factors the court used to deter-
mine the likelihood of confusion). 
71 See Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495 (establishing factors that the Second Circuit still uses 
in determining trademark infringement); see also LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2] 
(stating the Second Circuit uses eight factors in judging likelihood of confusion). 
72 See id. 287 F.2d at 495–96 (applying an eight-factor balancing test in determining 
trademark infringement); see also LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2] (discussing that 
while certain jurisdictions use different tests, many of the factors including strength of the 
senior user’s mark, intent of the junior user, and evidence of actual confusion are included 
in each test). 
73 See Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 494–95. 
74 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2]. 
75 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006) (establishing a federal cause of action for non-registered 
trademarks). 
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ments to establish a valid unfair competition claim.76 Unlike federally 
registered trademarks, however, unregistered trademarks are met with a 
higher burden of proof for each element.77 Under cases concerning 
either section 1114 or 1125, courts often refer back to the general pur-
pose of trademark law: to prevent confusion as to the source or origin 
of the goods being offered.78 
2. Dilution 
 In 1996, after years of debate, Congress amended section 1125 by 
adding the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA).79 This amendment 
to the Lanham Act extended trademark rights by offering protection 
beyond marks on directly competing goods; it established a federal 
cause of action preventing products from using similar marks if use of 
those marks could tarnish or harm a senior user’s mark.80 The new 
amendment sought to prevent the “lessening of the capacity of a famous 
mark” regardless of a genuine issue of confusion direct competition.81 
Essentially, in passing the FTDA, Congress allowed even more protec-
tion to the most famous trademark holders by allowing such holders to 
prove that their mark was so prevalent in the marketplace that non-
competing uses could diminish the effectiveness of the mark.82 For col-
legiate institutions with significant national recognition, the new anti-
dilution amendments add another potential weapon.83 
                                                                                                                      
76 See id.; see also Lattinville, supra note 50, at 84–85. 
77 See Lattinville, supra note 50, at 84–85. As a result of increased understanding of 
trademark rights by collegiate institutions, most marks a university would want to control 
are now trademarked. See id. Coupling that with the increased burdens for non-registered 
marks, it seems unlikely that a university would pursue a suit against a high school defen-
dant on a non-registered mark. See id. 
78 See 1 McCarthy, supra note 25, §§ 2.1–.2 (discussing the initial purpose of the Lan-
ham Act). 
79 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 
985, 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006)); see Bertagna, supra note 44, at 265 
(discussing the initial question that led to the enactment of the FTDA in 1996). 
80 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.05[B][1] (making note of the legislative history 
behind the FTDA); see also Bertagna, supra note 44, at 266–67 (highlighting a bill that rec-
ommended an addition to the Lanham Act for dilution which was eventually adopted 
nearly verbatim). 
81 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); see also LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.05 (noting that 
scholars have criticized the dilution statutes as an unwarranted extension of federal 
trademark protection). 
82 See Bertagna, supra note 44, at 266–68 (discussing generally the effects of the FTDA 
and the damages now allowed under the Lanham Act). 
83 See Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 209–10 (noting several cases where colle-
giate institutions have successfully litigated cases based on a claim of dilution). 
1844 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1833 
 Nearly ten years after the passage of the anti-dilution legislation, 
Congress substantially changed the scope of the bill by passing the 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA).84 The effective result of the 
TDRA requires a mere likelihood of dilution rather than dilution in 
fact.85 This latest amendment continued the trend of granting greater 
federal statutory protection for trademark owners, resulting in a greater 
number of assertions by owners of famous marks, including collegiate 
institutions.86 
cots.91 As a result, universities have used trademark protection to form 
                                                                                                                     
II. The History and Development of the Collegiate 
Merchandising Right and the Use of  
Trademark Protection 
 The primary reason for collegiate institutions’ new found aggres-
sion in defending their trademarks is that universities now have more 
to protect.87 Despite the current popularity of collegiate athletics and 
the billion dollar business that it has become, it is only over the past 
twenty-five years that colleges and universities started converting that 
popularity into a significant source of revenue.88 As trademark rights 
have expanded, universities have used the increased legal protection to 
protect everything from school logos,89 to color schemes,90 to mas-
 
 
84 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (holding that the 
1996 FTDA deserves a narrower reading than to allow tarnishment as part of the statutory 
definition of dilution). 
85 See 1 McCarthy, supra note 25, §§ 5.10–.11 (discussing the effects of the amend-
ments to the anti-dilution laws). 
86 See id. (noting that Congress passed the Revision Act as a response to the Supreme 
Court’s concerns and holding in Moseley); see also Grinvald, supra note 17, at 638–40 (ana-
lyzing the effects of increased statutory protection for owners of famous trademarks). 
87 See Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 207 (reporting that collegiate licensing an-
nually tops 3 billion dollars in sales and resides only behind Major League Baseball and 
the National Football League in terms of major sports sales revenue). 
88 See Revoyr, supra note 27, at 370–78 (discussing the history of collegiate licensing, 
and showing that before the 1980s, few colleges understood the potential revenue streams 
of official collegiate merchandise). 
89 See Halle Stockton, Another ‘No’ in Manatee High, FSU Squabble, Sarasota Herald-Trib. 
(Oct. 23, 2010), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20101023/ARTICLE/10231036/0/ 
sports (highlighting the ongoing negotiations between Florida State University and Southeast 
High School over the use of a Seminole Indian Head as each program’s logo). 
90 Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 475–76 
(5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a school’s color scheme can acquire a secondary meaning 
and thus be protected by trademark). 
91 See Univ. of Ga. v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1541 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Univer-
sity of Georgia’s mascot, an English Bulldog, was arbitrary and suggestive and therefore able 
to be trademarked by the university); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of 
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profitable merchandising arms which allow them to benefit greatly by 
asserting an almost monopolistic control on any product that utilizes 
marks either created by or associated with the school.92 This Part looks 
at the origin and evolution of collegiate merchandising, the formation 
of Licensing Groups, and the reasons for and effects of collegiate insti-
tutions asserting and expanding their trademark rights.93 
A. The Rise of Collegiate Merchandising 
  With the inc chandising 
eve
tions relied mainly on their 
wn
                                                                                                                     
reased notoriety of collegiate athletics, mer
r nue has also increased steadily over the past thirty years.94 The 
NCAA ranks alongside the most popular professional sports leagues 
(the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL) in terms of revenue earned from offi-
cially licensed products.95 Yet, revenue from professional leagues paral-
lels revenue from collegiate merchandise as a direct result of a drastic 
increase in collegiate merchandising revenue in the past quarter of a 
century.96 Perhaps not coincidentally, this increase in merchandising 
revenue mirrors the growth of trademark protection and intellectual 
property rights within the United States.97 
 Starting in the 1930s, collegiate institu
o  bookstores to sell merchandise and apparel featuring their marks.98 
Into the beginning of the 1980s, universities were satisfied earning 
 
Trademark Uses in Entertainment, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 1011, 1058 (2009) (stating that courts have 
expanded the definition of confusion further than originally written in the Lanham Act). 
92 See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile The-
ory or Fait Accompli?, 54 Emory L.J. 461 (2005) (analyzing the theory, asserted by trademark 
owners, that as a result of acquiring trademarks, owners exclusively hold the right to profit 
from those marks and that non-owners must have a license to use the marks for any pur-
pose). 
93 See infra notes 94–123 and accompanying text. 
94 See Revoyr, supra note 27, at 370–78 (noting the growth of revenue in college licens-
ing from the 1930s until 1998); see also Lattinville, supra note 50, at 81–82 (discussing the 
steep incline in revenue growth from collegiate licensing since the 1970s). 
95 See Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 207. 
96 See Revoyr, supra note 27, at 376–78 (discussing the snowball effect that collegiate li-
censing began to experience starting into the 1980s and continuing through the past dec-
ade). 
97 See, supra notes 25–86 and accompanying text. 
98 See Revoyr, supra note 27, at 371–72 (discussing the initial history of collegiate ap-
parel and the development of collegiate institution’s merchandising rights). In one of the 
first known instances of collegiate merchandising, the UCLA bookstore called and asked a 
garment producer if they could order just two dozen shirts with the initials “UCLA” on the 
front because they were not sure that people would be willing to buy such products. Id. 
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modest, six-figure revenues for their licensing of official merchandise.99 
Twenty-five years later, however, the twelve member institutions of the 
Southeastern Conference (SEC) alone accounted for over 600 million 
dollars in retail sales of officially licensed products.100 
 Prior to the 1980s, only a handful of collegiate institutions had de-
veloped formal licensing programs that were engaged in protecting 
their trademarks and products.101 In 1973, when Ohio State University, 
relying on the strength of its football team, applied for a trademark reg-
istration on its name and mascot, it was notable for its ingenuity.102 Soon 
after though, emboldened by a string of trademark decisions favoring 
the professional sports leagues, other major universities throughout the 
nation began to formulate their own merchandising and licensing pro-
grams.103 Nevertheless, until 1984, many bookstore managers and li-
censing directors were uncertain that university emblems were available 
for lawful trademark protection.104 As universities’ attorneys began to 
opine that colleges did in fact have a right to trademark protection, in-
stitutions, en masse, began to register for trademarks with an eye to-
wards merchandising revenue.105 These registrations led to a belief that 
colleges could control the use of their marks exclusively, and as a result, 
require that any product with these marks be licensed through them.106 
The practical effect of this “merchandising right theory” is that every 
collegiate institution with an NCAA Division I athletic program, and 
                                                                                                                      
99 See Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 207 (explaining the differences between the 
expectations of universities, in regards to their marketing rights, in the 1980s and the in-
credible increase in merchandise revenue over the past two decades). 
100 Id. 
101 See Revoyr, supra note 27, at 370–72. 
102 See id. at 372. 
103 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 92, at 472–74 (discussing the separate decisions in 
1975 concern the merchandising rights of the NFL and NHL that led to an expanded 
practice of trademark holders attempting to obtain royalties for the sale of their trade-
marks). 
104 See Revoyr, supra note 27, at 378 (“‘The symbols and emblems of colleges and uni-
versities may validly function as trademarks, which may form the basis for lawful licensing 
activities.’” (quoting an attorney speaking at the 1984 National Association of College 
Stores Conference)). 
105 See id.; see also Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 491 (allowing Louisiana to claim trademark 
rights as a result of their unique color scheme); Laite, 756 F.2d at 1545–47 (expanding 
trademark protection to University of Georgia’s bulldog mascot). 
106 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 92, at 472–78 (arguing that trademark owners de-
veloped a theory, based on case law and interpretation of that case law, that owners own 
almost exclusive control of their marks and the profits that derive from use of those 
marks). 
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many without, now have formal licensing programs and registered 
trademarks.107 
B. The Formation of Licensing Agents 
 As collegiate institutions began to rely on the “merchandising right 
theory,” there was no official way for a school to convert these poten-
tially valuable rights to automatic revenue streams.108 Just as collegiate 
institutions were originally unsure they had these rights to begin with, 
they became equally unsure in how to administer these rights.109 The 
resulting confusion led to significant inefficiencies,110 with each school 
independently trying to figure out how best to register, control, and 
profit from their trademarks.111 These inefficiencies led to a need for 
expertise and experience in dealing with trademark and trademark li-
censing.112 
 Licensing agents were created under the premise that one central 
agency representing multiple schools could more efficiently control, 
protect, and profit off of institutional trademark rights.113 Using econo-
mies of scale, licensing agents acquired the expertise necessary to im-
plement their own formalized licensing program and did so better than 
an individual school would have been able to using its own unilateral 
                                                                                                                      
107 See id.; see also Revoyr, supra note 27, at 378–81 (discussing the belief that trademark 
protection existed for all university marks and emblems and how that belief was furthered 
by the interpretation of legal settlements in disputes over collegiate trademark rights). 
108 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 92, at 472–74. 
109 See Revoyr, supra note 27, at 385–87. The uncertainty that institutions faced in ad-
ministering a formalized licensing programs is best exemplified by the fact that schools 
differed in the departments that they placed their licensing programs under. See id. While 
some institutions placed their licensing arms under the General Counsel’s office or ath-
letic department, many other schools placed the program under the watch of the campus 
bookstore, the technology department, or even the alumni relations office. See id. at 381–
82. 
110 See id. at 380–87. These inefficiencies resulted from the fact that many universities 
did not have the personnel available to handle many of the issues that came with the newly 
invoked intellectual property rights. See id. General Counsels for universities were not typi-
cally well versed in intellectual property law, marketing departments were not used to deal-
ing with promotion and sales of merchandise, and athletic departments were not prepared 
for the influx in requests for officially licensed products. See id. 
111 See id. at 385–87. 
112 See Lattinville, supra note 50, at 87–90 (describing what advantages licensing agents 
presented institutions when deciding whether to employ a licensing agent or their own 
independent licensing program). 
113 See id. 
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plan.114 Although some of the biggest schools have been able to main-
tain their own independent licensing departments,115 many institutions 
have chosen to employ one of the two major licensing agents: the Colle-
giate Licensing Company (CLC) or the Licensing Resource Group 
(LRG).116 By hiring a licensing agent, schools contractually transfer 
many aspects of production, contract negotiation, and even marketing, 
in exchange for a fee, as high as fifty percent of revenue sold.117 
 Nonetheless, for many institutions, that fee is a small price to pay 
for licensing agents’ experience and ability to protect against trade-
mark infringement.118 Due to their unique interest in trademarks and 
licensing agreements, licensing agents such as CLC have their own le-
gal departments that specialize in this particular area of trademark 
law.119 These specialized departments focus not only on litigating 
against known trademark infringers but also identifying and seeking 
out potential infringers.120 
 Often when a high school receives a notice that it is infringing on 
a collegiate institution’s trademark, the legal department of a licensing 
agent has sent the C&D letter.121 By hiring third-party licensing agents, 
universities are often required by the terms of that contract to enforce 
their trademark rights against those the agent believes to be in viola-
                                                                                                                      
114 See id.; see also Revoyr, supra note 27, at 380–89 (outlining the reason for and the his-
tory of licensing agents as well as the reason that many institutions chose to contract with 
them rather than continue installing their own independent licensing programs). 
115 See Lattinville, supra note 50, at 87. The University of Notre Dame, widely consid-
ered the biggest collegiate football program that does not affiliate itself with a conference, 
also maintains its own independent licensing program. See id. 
116 See id. at 88–89 (discussing the two major collegiate licensing companies and their 
expansive lists of clients, which include universities, conferences, and bowl games). 
117 See id. at 87 (stating that the high end for fees to licensing agents is forty to fifty 
percent). 
118 See id. at 88–90; see also Revoyr, supra note 27, at 385–89 (describing the processes 
and procedures of licensing agents). 
119 See Trademark Enforcement, Collegiate Licensing Company, http://www.clc.com/ 
clcweb/publishing.nsf/Content/trademark+enforcement.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
The CLC website lists “Trademark Enforcement” first on their list of client services pro-
vided. See id. The LRG website actually notes that LRG has trademarked their own trade-
mark management tools (“Trademarx”) to provide the best possible services to their cli-
ents in license management and trademark protection. See About Trademarx, Licensing 
Resource Group, http://www.lrgusa.com/trademarx.php.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) 
[hereinafter LRG Website]. 
120 See LRG Website, supra note 119 (describing the licensing group’s brand strategy and 
highlighting the protection of clients’ brands as a key to this strategy). 
121 See Cormier, supra note 4, at BN3. 
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tion.122 As a result of this contract between the university and the li-
censing agent, the agencies as private businesses have every incentive to 
aggressively pursue potential infringement claims without having the 
restrictions that may cause an educational institution to defer from 
such pursuits.123 
                                                                                                                     
III. The Assertion and Extension of the Merchandising Right 
 As discussed in Part I and Part II,124 both the expansive nature of 
the Lanham Act and the increased revenues from collegiate merchan-
dise have led collegiate institutions to step up their pursuit of trade-
mark infringers, including asserting trademark rights against non-
traditional parties like high schools.125 In a letter to Murietta Valley 
High School, Iowa Trademark Licensing Director Dale Arens stated 
that federal law requires trademark holders to police their own trade-
marks.126 He went on to say that if the university allowed unauthorized 
use of its marks, it “risks losing its trademark rights altogether.”127 Al-
though it seems unreasonable that allowing a high school to use a col-
lege’s logo could cause an institution to lose trademark rights, that no-
tion appears to be the principal fear, or at least the stated reason, for 
most universities sending C&Ds.128 
 Increased revenue from the development of intellectual property 
rights have prompted universities to increase their protection and as-
sertion to the rights that they believe they have acquired.129 Similarly, 
case law regarding collegiate institutions and their trademark rights has 
ratified this belief that collegiate institutions receive expansive legal 
 
122 See Lattinville, supra note 50, at 89–90 (analyzing the licensing agreements between 
universities and licensing agents and the benefits of such arrangements). 
123 See id. at 88–92; see also Scott Bearby & Bruce Siegal, From the Stadium Parking Lot to 
the Information Superhighway: How to Protect Your Trademarks from Infringement, 28 J.C. & U.L. 
633, 640–45 (2002) (highlighting the requirements on trademark holders or licensees to 
police their own trademarks). 
124 See supra notes 25–123 and accompanying text. 
125 See infra notes 126–156 and accompanying text. 
126 See Iowa Letter, supra note 6 (“If the University of Iowa allows the unauthorized use 
of its trademarks with no attempt to prevent such use, the University risks losing its trade-
mark rights altogether.”). 
127 See id.; see also Abrahams, supra note 12 (reporting that while the University of Wis-
consin’s head football coach and athletic director told the Woodlands High School not to 
worry about a similarly designed logo, the university representatives changed their minds 
and asked that the high school cease to use a depiction of the letter W that seemed similar 
to the university’s trademarked logo). 
128 See Iowa Letter, supra note 6 (noting the rationale behind the decision of a univer-
sity to send a C&D letter to a high school). 
129 See supra notes 87–123 and accompanying text. 
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protection of trademark rights.130 This Part discusses the key decisions 
that have furthered collegiate institutions’ reliance on legal protection 
of their marks and the resulting expansion of rights that universities 
have asserted surrounding those marks.131 
A. Early Case Law Interpretation of Collegiate Licensing Rights  
and Trademark Protection 
 Not surprisingly, the first legal dispute in collegiate licensing arose 
at the 1977 Sugar Bowl when the manager of the University of Pitts-
burgh (“Pitt”) bookstore noted the incredible volume of Pittsburgh em-
blems and garments worn by the crowd.132 This realization caused Pitt 
school officials to register successfully twenty-nine trademarks.133 After 
the marks were registered, Pitt sent notice of the marks to Champion, 
the main supplier of Pitt’s athletic uniforms and merchandise, and re-
quested that Champion execute a license agreement; Champion re-
fused, and a complicated lawsuit followed.134 Although the District 
Court twice ruled in favor of Champion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit ruled mostly in favor of Pitt; with the prospect of an-
other appeal going before the Third Circuit, Champion eventually 
agreed to a still-undisclosed, out-of-court settlement that executed a li-
censing agreement between both parties.135 
 After settlement, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania dismissed the case and vacated its judgment, leaving only 
the Third Circuit’s ruling and the undisclosed settlement, which pro-
vides little guidance regarding licensing agreements between universi-
ties and manufacturers.136 This outcome, although somewhat split, 
                                                                                                                      
 
130 See infra notes 126–156 and accompanying text. 
131 See infra notes 126–156 and accompanying text. 
132 See Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc. (Pitt II ), 686 F.2d 1040, 1043 (3d 
Cir. 1982), remanded to 566 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (citing the account of the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh’s bookstore manager concerning the amount of “Pitt” insignias that were 
dispersed amongst the 1977 Sugar Bowl Crowd). 
133 See id. at 1043–44. 
134 Id. 
135 See id. at 1049 (holding generally in favor of Pitt); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion 
Prods., Inc. (Pitt III ) 566 F. Supp. 711, 722 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Cham-
pion Prods., Inc. (Pitt I ) 529 F. Supp. 464, 469 (W.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
686 F.2d 1040, remanded to 566 F. Supp. 711; see also Bearby & Siegal, supra note 123, at 637–
38 (discussing the importance of the Pitt-Champion dispute and the effect it had on colle-
giate licensing and the belief in trademark rights for universities). 
136 See Pitt II, 686 F.2d at 1049 (remanding the case to district court and granting a pro-
spective injunction to Pitt against Champion to prevent further use of their registered 
marks on merchandise); Bearby & Siegal, supra note 123, at 639 (stating that “the district 
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seemed like a legal victory for universities in that it allowed them to es-
tablish control of their marks and use them to create licensing agree-
ments with potential producers—even those who were already in the 
business of producing merchandise bearing university insignias and 
emblems.137 
 Soon thereafter, that view of the Pitt-Champion dispute was con-
firmed in a decision by U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.138 In 1985, in University of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed a lower court’s injunction preventing a would-be beer 
distributor from using a logo that the University of Georgia claimed was 
similar both in appearance and color scheme to its mascot, an English 
Bulldog.139 In a spirited opinion, which colorfully referenced the Uni-
versity’s success on the athletic fields, the Eleventh Circuit focused on 
the strength of Georgia’s mark, the similarity of the marks, and the po-
tential intent of the defendant to confuse customers as to whether a 
link existed between the beer company and the university.140 Although 
the opinion itself showed the fact-intensive process used by the court, 
many in the licensing world saw this as further proof that courts would 
protect collegiate institution’s trademarks to the fullest.141 
                                                                                                                      
court’s judgment was vacated by consent of the parties”); see also Andrew D. Baharlias, 
. . . Yes I Think the Yankees Might Sue If We Named Our Popcorn ‘Yankee Toffee Crunch.’ A Compre-
hensive Look at Trademark Infringement Defenses in the Context of the Professional and Collegiate 
Sports Industry, 8 Seton Hall H. Sport L. 99, 105–06 (1998) (discussing what the actual 
issues being decided in the Pitt-Champion dispute were). But see Pitt III, 566 F. Supp. at 722 
(holding that Pitt may not recover on claims of previous trademark infringement because 
Champion was the first user of Pitt marks on merchandise). 
137 See Bearby & Siegal, supra note 123, at 638–41 (noting the procedural process, con-
text, and eventual result of the Pitt-Champion dispute and then discussing the cases that 
followed); see also Lattinville, supra note 50, at 86–87 (listing the Pitt-Champion dispute as 
starting a promising trend for universities in case law); Revoyr, supra note 27, at 378–80 
(detailing Champion’s role at the start of licensing and collegiate merchandise and dis-
cussing the company’s ulterior motives to settle). Besides Pittsburgh, Champion was the 
producer for multiple high-profile athletic programs at the start of the 1980s, and because 
they too were caught off guard by the quick development of trademark rights and colle-
giate licensing, the settlement they agreed to with Pittsburgh may have had more to do 
with their general business model than the merits of the case. See Revoyr, supra note 27, at 
378–80. 
138 See Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546–47 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that the University of Georgia trademarked mascot was infringed against by a 
beer producer by trying to sell a product called “Battlin’ Bulldog Beer”). 
139 See id. at 1540–47 (discussing the use of secondary meaning and the application of 
the 11th Circuit’s likelihood of confusion test to reach the conclusion that the defendant 
had in fact infringed upon the plaintiff’s trademark rights). 
140 See id. 
141 See Bearby & Siegal, supra note 123, at 639–40 (mentioning the “Battlin’ Bulldog” 
case as further extension of collegiate trademark and licensing rights). 
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 Adding more weight to this perceived “merchandising right” of col-
leges, in 1989 in Board of Governors of University of North Carolina v. Help-
ingstine, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina 
held that the University of North Carolina had not abandoned its 
trademark rights by allowing unauthorized users to utilize marks that 
were now protected by the university.142 Several years later, in a proceed-
ing before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the Appeal 
Board reconfirmed the holding in Helpingstine, and allowed the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin to register marks that had not been used by the univer-
sity for years but had been in constant use by local merchants.143 The 
cumulative effect of these cases was to establish a perception that courts 
would protect trademark rights of collegiate institutions heavily, includ-
ing the right to control and license merchandise containing marks asso-
ciated with the school regardless of previous use by outside parties.144 
B. The Continued Expansion of Collegiate Trademark Rights 
 As case law began to cement the belief that universities were af-
forded the broadest protection available under the Lanham Act, colle-
giate institutions began to assert more rights afforded under this pro-
tection.145 In 1995, the University of Arkansas brought suit against a 
local physical rehabilitation clinic that used the school’s nickname, Ra-
                                                                                                                      
142 See Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 176–77 
(M.D.N.C. 1989) (holding that the University of North Carolina, despite failing to prose-
cute non-licensed users of university-held trademarks for a number of years, had not aban-
doned those marks and could bring action against non-licensed users in the future). 
143 See Univ. Book Store v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1393–94 
(T.T.A.B. 1994) (permitting the University of Wisconsin to register certain trademarks 
despite opposition from local merchants who claimed the university had abandoned such 
marks by not using them for a period of years). 
144 See Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. at 176–77; Univ. Wis. Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d at 
1393–94 ; see also Bearby & Siegal, supra note 123, at 640–42 (discussing the trend of cases 
to expanding collegiate licensing, merchandising, and trademark rights). 
145 See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 
550 F.3d 465, 491 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding for several universities with high-profile athletic 
programs joined together to sue defendant over the use of color schemes and implied 
connections to the plaintiff’s institutions); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark. v. Prof. 
Therapy Servs., Inc. (Razorback), 873 F. Supp. 1280, 1292 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (holding for 
University of Arkansas on a trademark claim brought about by a local business using the 
school’s Razorback name and similar logo); see also Adam Liptak, Sports Artist Sued for Mix of 
Crimson and Tide, N.Y. Times (Nov. 12, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/us/ 
12artist.html (reporting that the University of Alabama was suing a local artist who was 
made famous by his renderings of famous moments in University of Alabama football his-
tory). 
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zorback, in its business name.146 Citing many of the aforementioned 
decisions, the court held that Arkansas had acquired a strong mark and 
that if there was even the smallest likelihood of confusion on the ties of 
a business to the university, the university should prevail.147 This deci-
sion along with a 1995 Supreme Court decision regarding the protec-
tion of color schemes, led collegiate institutions to step up their efforts 
in dutifully protecting their marks.148 
 Over the next decade, collegiate institutions began to file a variety 
of trademark claims against businesses.149 Court decisions seemed to 
solidify the theory that the unauthorized use of a mark is enough to 
gain legal trademark protection.150 One decision in particular, a 2006 
case involving several universities with high-profile athletic programs, 
expanded trademark protection to include color schemes and other 
“indentifying indicia” without direct use of registered marks.151 The 
2008 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, Board 
of Supervisors for Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical Col-
lege v. Smack Apparel Co., was seen as the latest legal victory for collegiate 
licensing and was followed by another favorable ruling that seemed to 
confirm that collegiate institutions’ trademark and licensing rights had 
yet to meet their legal ceiling.152 
 The practical effect of these decisions in favor of colleges, along 
with the continued expansion of trademark law in America, is that col-
leges and universities believe that they have the exclusive right to license 
their merchandise and that any non-licensed use is a violation of legal 
                                                                                                                      
146 See Razorback, 873 F. Supp. at 1283–86. 
147 See id. at 1285–92 (holding that the “Razorback” Therapy Clinic did infringe on the 
university’s trademark rights because of the strength of the mark, the proximity of the 
goods, and the likelihood of confusion). 
148 Id. at 1292; see Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods., Co., 514 U.S. 159, 172–74 (1995) 
(holding that colors may sometimes meet the basic legal standards for trademark protec-
tion); see also Lattinville, supra note 50, at 87 (arguing that Qualitex may serve as precedent 
for collegiate institutions trying to protect colors under the Lanham Act). 
149 See Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 479–91 (discussing the assertion of claims by several 
schools). 
150 See Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 209–10 (discussing the recent efforts of col-
legiate institutions in enforcement of trademark protections, and listing cases that were 
settled out of court as a result of the increased attention colleges put on trademark en-
forcement). 
151 See Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 491 (holding that color schemes combined with other 
indentifying marks can serve as a trademark violation). Smack Apparel represented a joint 
effort by multiple schools to stop a “known” infringer who typically sold merchandise out-
side of major athletic events. See Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 218–24 (discussing 
the impact of the Smack Apparel case). 
152 Id. at 224 (stating that the Smack Apparel decision was a “landmark” victory). 
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trademark protection.153 This has led to more and more settlements 
between collegiate institutions and third-party users, which only rein-
force the universities’ belief that they have broad, and ever-expanding, 
legal protection.154 Under this expansion, collegiate institutions, and 
the licensing agents that represent them, have begun to expand their 
scope past the traditional parties that the case law was built on.155 Yet 
despite multiple threatened lawsuits, a court has yet to hear a dispute 
between a university and a high school on a trademark infringement 
claim.156 
                                                                                                                     
IV. Reassessment of Trademark Protection 
 As seen in Parts I, II, and III, trademark law, especially with regards 
to collegiate licensing practices and rights, has expanded over the past 
twenty years as a result of increased statutory protection and broad ju-
dicial interpretation of those statutes.157 Nevertheless, legislation and 
case law are not the only reasons why universities have been able to en-
joy such broad protection.158 Part of the expansion is a result of risk 
aversion and the attitude of non-licensed trademark users.159 Often, 
 
153 See Gibson, supra note 15, at 907–27 (setting forth the “accretion rights” theory that 
trademark users who strongly assert their trademark rights gain more confidence and 
broader recognition of their rights every time another party concedes to the trademark 
owner’s assertion). 
154 Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 237–38 (arguing that the recent court deci-
sions have trended “mightily” in favor of colleges and universities and their merchandising 
rights). 
155 See Liptak, supra note 145 (reporting on the University of Alabama suing a local art-
ist); see also Seahawks, A&M Resolve 12th Man Dispute, ESPN NFL (May 8, 2006), http:// 
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2437992 (reporting that the Seattle Seahawks set-
tled a dispute with Texas A&M over a trademarked slogan). Texas A&M trademarked the 
phrase “12th Man” as a reference to a position on their football team reserved for and in 
reference to the general college population; the Seattle Seahawks also used this term to 
refer to their fans. See id. The resulting settlement allowed the Seahawks to continue using 
the slogan, but as a licensee of Texas A&M. See id. 
156 See Halley, supra note 9 (noting that there are no known disputes between colleges 
and high schools that have been litigated). 
157 See supra notes 25–156 and accompanying text. 
158 See Gibson, supra note 15, at 907–27. Gibson argues that trademark law has ex-
panded not only in legal protection but also as a result of marketplace conditions: as the 
use of licensed copyrights, trademarks, and other intellectual property licenses grow, the 
market comes to expect such licensees. See id. As a result, this market feedback convinces 
both the owner and non-licensed user that the legal protection is in the owner’s favor. See 
id. 
159 See id.; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 92, at 478–79 (noting that court deci-
sions and general uncertainty have led to an expectation of trademark owner’s licensing 
rights). 
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non-licensed trademark users will seek a license even when it might not 
be necessary to do so.160 This results in an environment in which users 
see non-licensed uses as outliers and licenses as the norm.161 This nor-
mative effect not only emboldens universities in their enforcement of 
trademark protection but also acts as a deterrent to a non-licensed user 
when confronted by a trademark holder.162 This Part examines whether 
high schools are actually infringing collegiate institutions’ trademark 
rights by considering the factors courts have adopted in trademark dis-
putes and analyzing case language that hints at a narrower interpreta-
tion for non-business, unlicensed uses of trademarks.163 
     
A. Applying the Polaroid Factors to High School Infringement 
 As discussed in Part I, a general cause of action for trademark in-
fringement usually hinges on the likelihood of confusion.164 The gen-
eral standard is whether an “appreciable number” of ordinary consum-
ers would likely be confused as to the origin of the goods or services or 
whether there is a connection between the junior user and the senior 
user of a mark.165 Courts, in adhering to this standard, usually engage 
in a fact-specific inquiry and apply those facts to a general list of six, 
seven, or eight factors, which are taken in totality.166 Although many 
jurisdictions have slight variations, the general scope of the test is the 
same for almost all federal and state courts.167 This Part uses the factors 
                                                                                                                 
160 See Gibson, supra note 15, at 907 (“[T]rademark users often seek a license even 
when none is needed.”); see also Rosenblatt, supra note 91, at 1037 (“A culture of ‘license, 
don’
ffirmed the belief that trademark protection is strongly in 
favo
attern, which fosters a consumer perception that all trademark uses 
mus
. 
) (outlining the general parame-
ters
ight factors that determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists in a trademark 
suit
sdictions may apply them a 
bit d tandard remains nearly the same). 
t litgate’ has arisen.”). 
161 See Gibson, supra note 15, at 907–08 (noting that consumer perception is as impor-
tant as what the law actually is); see also Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 237 (conclud-
ing that court decisions have rea
r of collegiate institutions). 
162 See Rosenblatt,, supra note 91, at 1040 (noting that the license-don’t-litigate culture 
creates a circular p
t be licensed). 
163 See infra notes 164–228 and accompanying text
164 See supra notes 25–86 and accompanying text. 
165 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][1] (2005
 courts use in determining likelihood of confusion). 
166 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (identi-
fying e
). 
167 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2] (stating that many of the Polaroid factors 
are universally recognized and that even though different juri
ifferently, the general s
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laid out by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the se-
uld have on an ordinary, pru-
ent
sion standard of 
impart to an ordinary person a similar impression.175 
                                                                                                                     
minal case, Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.168 
1. Factors All Courts Consider 
 First, the starting point in most likelihood of confusion cases is 
whether the marks of the junior and senior user are similar.169 Conse-
quently, a court finding dissimilarity between the marks will almost al-
ways lead to a holding of non-infringement.170 Courts have held that 
similarity is based not only on appearance but also on the total effect 
and overall impression that the marks wo
d  person.171 This overall impression standard seems to be somewhat 
overlooked by collegiate institutions insisting that high schools are in-
fringing on their trademark rights.172 
 A similar looking logo might only be similar in appearance and 
not overall impression.173 An ordinary, prudent person—the type, per-
haps, likely to buy merchandise from the University of Wisconsin—is 
not likely to be confused by seeing a red “W” on a green background, 
especially when the university identifies itself through “the red, white, 
and black color scheme.”174 Given the overall impres
similarity, college institutions would likely have to prove that logos, 
nicknames, and mascots are not only similar in appearance, but also 
 
168 See 287 F.2d at 495. 
169 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2][a]. 
170 Id. (arguing that a finding that marks are not similar will usually lead to the subjec-
tive judgment that the rest of the likelihood of confusion analysis is unnecessary). 
171 See Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29–30 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that si-
milarity is based on the total effect of the designation and not just the individual features 
of the marks). 
172 See Stockton, supra note 89 (reporting that Florida State University insists that the 
appearance of the marks is similar and therefore protected by Florida State’s trademark 
rights despite the logos being completely different colors). 
173 See Abrahams, supra note 12 (reporting that students believe that their “W” is dif-
ferent because it identifies their school through the colors used rather than the other fea-
tures claimed by the University of Wisconsin). 
174 See Graphic Standards for the Proper Use of UW Colleges and Campus Logos, Univ. Wiscon-
sin Colls., http://www.uwc.edu/resources/graphic_standards/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2011) 
(stating that logos should reinforce the University of Wisconsin identity by using the colors 
red, black, and white); see also Highlanders: The Woodlands Football, http://www.high 
landerfootball.net/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (showing that the Woodlands High School 
uses a red W on a green background as their color scheme). 
175 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2][a] (highlighting that the overall impres-
sion of the marks is the standard used by courts, not just similarity in appearance). 
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 Second, in addition to the similarity between the marks, in a 
trademark infringement suit, a court will always look at the strength of 
the plaintiff’s mark.176 As the Razorback court discussed, a strong and 
distinctive mark is entitled to greater protection than a weak or com-
monplace one.177 As discussed in Part I, the strength of the mark is of-
ten a product of its distinctiveness in itself and distinctiveness in the 
marketplace.178 Consequently, a university’s mark might be distinctive in 
certain settings but if the logo is similar to other logos in the market-
place or the nickname is used by other parties as well, the strength and 
distinctiveness of the mark may be lessened.179 Although not the most 
popular nickname, even a name like the Beavers, generates a list of ten 
different colleges use the Beaver as their mascot.180 For example, were 
Oregon State to claim that a high school’s version of a Beaver is too 
close to its trademarked version, the presence of other institutions using 
eir
user; in many high school-college disputes, however, the marks have 
been conc
                                 
th  own versions of Beavers would tend to show that the logo is not so 
unique as to be afforded the broadest level of trademark protection.181 
 A third factor that all courts consider in trademark infringement 
suits is actual confusion.182 In circumstances where there is proof of 
actual confusion, it will often carry substantial weight in determining 
the overall likelihood of confusion.183 Often, actual confusion is tough 
to prove because the marks have not yet caused injury to the senior 
urrently used for periods of years and sometimes even dec-
                                                                                     
ow distinctive that mark is in the mind of consumers, thus 
pote
 Supp. 
1280
Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 265 (5th Cir. 1980) (revers-
ing 
 
miliar, Pantagraph (Oct. 20, 2010), 
http
aFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2][e]. 
176 See id. § 3.02[B][2][c] (noting that courts determine strength by looking at the dis-
tinctiveness of the mark and h
ntially confusing a consumer as to the origin of the goods). 
177 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark. v. Prof. Therapy Servs. (Razorback), 873 F.
, 1285 (W.D. Ark. 1995). 
178 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2][c] (highlighting the fact that a mark’s 
strength is actually measured by two factors and not just distinctiveness in general). 
179 See 
a lower court decision, and holding that Dominos Sugar, despite the strength of its 
mark, was not distinctive in the marketplace because other companies used Dominos as a 
name). 
180 See List of Collegiate Nicknames, Adam Joshua Smargon, http://www.smargon.net/ 
nicknames (last updated Oct. 30, 2011) (showing the nickname Beavers is attributed to 10
different colleges throughout the United States). 
181 See Randy Sharer, High School Logos Can Look Fa
://www.allbusiness.com/education-training/extra-curricular-activities-school/15214978–1. 
html (discussing Oregon State’s claims against an Ohio high school). 
182 See L
183 See id. (stating that actual confusion may be the strongest element of the Polaroid 
factors and the lack of actual confusion may weaken a trademark infringement claim sig-
nificantly). 
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ades.184 For a collegiate institution to prove actual confusion, it must 
present either survey evidence or direct proof that instances of confu-
sion were more than isolated instances.185 In a situation like the Wood-
lands-Wisconsin dispute, evidence that alumni, those most likely to buy 
Wisconsin merchandise, were not confused, and in fact alerted the uni-
versity to the similarities in marks actually implies that actual confusion 
did not exist.186 Although proof of actual confusion can strengthen a 
plaintiff’s case, a lack of confusion can severely weaken it.187 
                                                                                                                     
 A fourth important element that courts look at is the proximity of 
the products being offered in the marketplace.188 In determining prox-
imity, courts look to the content of the products, the geographic prox-
imity, the market for the product, and consumer appeal.189 Although it 
can be argued that high schools and universities are both educational 
institutions, to say that they directly compete with one another would 
misrepresent the services provided by each.190 Simply put, high schools 
have never competed in team sports competitions against collegiate 
institutions, and if athletics are the driving force behind the collegiate 
merchandising boom, it seems clear that high school athletics exist in 
an entirely different market than collegiate athletics.191 Likewise, the 
merchandising revenue that even the top high school receives pales in 
comparison to a day’s worth of sales for the lowest-earning colleges.192 
Furthermore, in many situations, the geographic distance between the 
 
184 See Sharer, supra note 181 (noting that the Ohio High School has used the Beaver 
as t
e LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2][e](stating that “isolated instances of 
con
 out that University of Wisconsin alumni, who 
wer rity in appearance of the Woodlands 
Hig university’s). 
 (noting that in determining proximity, courts often use a sliding scale that 
req
lley, supra note 9 (comparing the differences between college and high 
scho
heir mascot for years); see also Stockton, supra note 89 (discussing how Southeast High 
School has used the Seminoles logo for as long as anyone at the school can remember). 
185 Se
fusion” or unclear evidence of confusion will be deemed insignificant or given little 
weight). 
186 See Abrahams, supra note 12 (pointing
e not confused, informed the school of the simila
h School “W” to that of the 
187 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2][e]. 
188 See id. § 3.02[B][2][b]. 
189 See id.
uires a higher degree of similarity in cases where goods are in direct competition with 
each other). 
190 See Ha
ol merchandising and the demographics they serve). 
191 See id. 
192 See id. (stating that high schools have earned as little as 30 dollars to a couple thou-
sand dollars on their licensing of merchandise). 
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high school and the university present another potential hurdle for the 
ad
f their operations.198 Colle-
ate
the junior user’s mark is identical to a well-known mark.202 Conversely, 
ma ls and universities concern 
     
tr emark owner.193 
2. Lesser Factors Courts May Consider 
 Besides similarity between the marks, the strength of the plaintiff’s 
mark, actual confusion, and proximity, many courts look at other ele-
ments in deciding trademark infringement claims.194 One element that 
the Polaroid court analyzed was the likelihood that the senior user 
would expand into the junior user’s market.195 This “bridging the gap” 
concept considers whether a senior user would ever become a direct 
competitor to a junior user in a market place.196 In a high school-
college licensing dispute, a university would have trouble proving that 
high school merchandise competes directly with its own, because high 
school merchandise generates little revenue and serves a different pur-
pose.197 Unlike colleges, most high schools do not count on merchan-
dise revenue to fund significant portions o
gi  merchandising has become a multi-billion-dollar business, and 
high school merchandise has certainly not withheld expansion of uni-
versity revenues streams up to this point.199 
 Another factor a court may look at in a trademark infringement 
suit is the intention of the defendant.200 Bad faith of the defendant is 
nearly impossible to prove, especially in the early stages of litigation.201 
As such, some courts have allowed for a presumption of bad faith when 
ny of the disputes between high schoo
                                                                                                                 
tes 195–213 and accompanying text. 
3.02[B][2][f] (explaining that bridging 
the 
, supra note 9 (discussing the ceiling for high school merchandising right 
now
 schools receive a small amount of merchandis-
ing 
ive 
and
y acquired a secondary meaning within the marketplace). 
193 See Sharer, supra note 181 (pointing out the incredible distance and differences be-
tween Oregon State University and Painesville High School in the great state of Ohio). 
194 See infra no
195 See Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495. The Polaroid court called this “bridg[ing] the gap.” See id. 
196 See id.; see also LaFrance, supra note 26, § 
gap often occurs only when the goods of the two parties are in direct competition and 
directly related). 
197 See Halley
 as being in the thousands of dollars). 
198 See id. (noting that even where high
revenue it is used to fund student groups or booster clubs and not overall school 
budgets). 
199 See supra notes 87–123 and accompanying text. 
200 See Razorback, 873 F. Supp. at 1291. 
201 See id. (stating that questions of intent and bad faith are typically non-determinat
 impossible to prove at the summary judgment level). 
202 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02 [B][2][g] (highlighting the rebuttable pre-
sumption that some courts allow for in cases where the junior user’s mark is identical to 
another mark that has alread
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logos that have been used for decades.203 Unless a high school has re-
cently switched logos or the marks are absolutely identical, a university 
ill 
low
w struggle to prove a high school acted in bad faith or intent.204 
 Another issue some courts consider in these suits is the sophistica-
tion of the buyer.205 A court may look at the average consumer of de-
fendant’s products and determine whether that consumer is more or 
less easily confused in determining the products’ source.206 With re-
gards to high school merchandise, which does not typically appear in 
many retail locations, the average consumer presumably has some 
knowledge of or affiliation with the school.207 As a result, courts will 
likely find that consumers of high school and college merchandise are 
at least of average sophistication, and therefore will not be confused 
easily.208 The combination of a typically sophisticated consumer who 
has at least some association with or knowledge of the junior user could 
al  court’s to require a higher threshold of confusion for plaintiffs.209 
 Finally, although some courts will take into consideration the qual-
ity of the defendant’s products, this factor seems to carry little weight, 
and in some jurisdictions it is not even discussed.210 One area that has 
been of concern to some courts, however, is price.211 If high school mer-
chandise is sold at a lower price than that of an identical product, some 
                                                                                                                      
203 See, e.g., Stockton, supra note 89. Southeastern High School has been using the Se-
minoles as nickname and many parts of their logo for as long as anyone associated with the 
school can remember and for a significant period of time with the blessing of members of 
Flor
th, the record was not absolutely 
clea ). 
ary consumer is typi-
call
e is ba-
sica
high
nd colors and therefore not likely to confuse even similar 
logo
0–92 (discussing the other Polaroid factors but 
not
 of confusion be-
cause the price should tip the consumer off to a difference in quality). 
ida State University. Id. 
204 See Razorback, 873 F. Supp. at 1291 (finding that despite significant evidence that the 
defendants might have used the plaintiff’s mark in bad fai
r and therefore no such conclusion could be drawn
205 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2][d]. 
206 See id. (supporting the theory that sophistication of an ordin
y less in those products that are sold to a broader demographic). 
207 See Halley, supra note 9 (noting that the market for high school merchandis
lly limited to those people associated with students that go to that high school). 
208 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2][d] (stating that courts typically raise the 
standard of confusion for consumers that have more knowledge and awareness of where 
and from whom they are buying goods); see also Halley, supra note 9 (discussing the fact 
that most high school merchandise is sold to family and friends of someone who is at the 
 school and therefore someone with knowledge of where the goods are coming from). 
209 See Stockton, supra note 89 (highlighting the fact that football fans are very knowl-
edgeable about their teams a
s if of a different color). 
210 See, e.g., Razorback, 873 F. Supp. at 129
 the quality of the defendant’s services). 
211 See LaFrance, supra note 26, § 3.02[B][2][h](mentioning that where price of the 
goods differs significantly, courts have found there to be less likelihood
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courts might say this reduces the likelihood of confusion.212 In sum, be-
cause high schools can make a strong argument against each factor 
courts use to determine trademark infringement, a collegiate plaintiff 
woul  
gh
ore, although no case has denied an institu-
on’
college is grounds for allowing a public interest argument and finding 
                                                 
d face a significant challenge if a high school chose to litigate their
ri ts.213 
B. Case Law Suggests Narrower Protection Against Trademark Infringement 
 By dissecting and analyzing the different Polaroid factors, it appears 
that the presumption for broad licensing rights is somewhat prema-
ture.214 Weighing each factor individually, and absent a completely iden-
tical mark, many universities would likely face a tough legal battle to 
prove a likelihood of confusion exists between their goods and that of a 
high school.215 Furtherm
ti s claims of trademark infringement, courts have provided some 
language to hint that the ceiling is not as far away as trademark holders 
might want to believe.216 
 In the 1989 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, Rogers v. Grimaldi, the court held that although a likelihood of con-
fusion existed, the public interest in freedom of expression outweighed 
the concern for consumer confusion.217 This type of public interest bal-
ancing test, which is still binding precedent for the Second Circuit and 
has been narrowly adopted in other federal circuits, demonstrates that 
courts may look at the overall circumstances of a dispute in their rul-
ings.218 Under this framework, even in a situation in which a court could 
find a likelihood of confusion, a court might determine that the in-
credible cost to a high school for a somewhat undetermined gain to a 
                                                                     
s should be halted because intellectual property doctrine, especially within 
the a presumption of broad rights. See 
id. a
989) (holding that despite the likelihood of 
con
.; see also Rosenblatt, supra note 91, at 1071–72 (noting that the Rogers test still 
has 
212 See id. 
213 See supra notes 169–212 and accompanying text. 
214 See Gibson, supra note 15, at 907–08. Gibson implies that almost all presumption of 
licensing right
scope of trademark law, was enacted to create such 
t 882–86. 
215 See supra notes 169–213 and accompanying text. 
216 See infra notes 217–228 and accompanying text. 
217 See 875 F.2d 994, 1004–05 (2d Cir. 1
fusion because of a movie’s title, the freedom of expression significantly outweighed 
the potential harm of consumer confusion). 
218 See id
precedential value and the other federal circuit courts have adopted similar ap-
proaches). 
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in favor of the high school.219 Especially in cases in which a state univer-
sity is threatening to bring suit against another state-funded educational 
utions’ trademark rights by acknowl-
                                                                                                                     
institute, albeit one with significantly less economic resources, a court 
might be tempted to apply an even broader public interest test.220 
 Although the Rogers test might allow a court to set aside a situation 
where the junior user is likely to confuse a consumer, a more recent 
case involving a collegiate institution suggests that universities are about 
to face more stringent, narrower protection for registered marks.221 In 
2008, in University of Kansas v. Sinks, the university brought a trademark 
infringement suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas 
against a local business owner who was denied a license to produce of-
ficially licensed merchandise.222 The business owner continued to op-
erate a merchandise retail store selling tee shirts that both directly and 
indirectly referenced the university.223 After conducting a fact-intensive 
likelihood of confusion test, the court granted summary judgment on 
only four out of two hundred claims of infringement despite many of 
the tee shirts utilizing similar colors, phrases, and designs as the univer-
sity’s registered marks.224 Although this holding did present a victory of 
sorts for the university, it also presented one of the first challenges to 
the expansion of collegiate instit
edging that almost two hundred shirts were not obviously infringing 
despite significant similarities.225 
 Notwithstanding Sinks, colleges are still asserting their trademark 
and merchandising rights just as aggressively.226 Nevertheless, a closer 
look at the likelihood of confusion test, case law, and recent scholarly 
 
ke other interests under consideration); 
see a pp. 2d 1216, 1269 (D. Kan. 2008) (implying a limit 
to u
 (holding that only 4 of the possible 200 de-
sign
dy & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 237–38 (arguing that the Sinks case was ac-
tual
219 See Rosenblatt, supra note 91, at 1072–76 (arguing for the expansion of the Rogers 
public interest balancing test). 
220 See Halley, supra note 9 (discussing the costs to a state-funded high school to avoid 
further legal action by a public university funded within the same state). 
221 See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1005 (holding that even in the case where the use of an unli-
censed mark might cause confusion, courts may ta
lso Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 F. Su
niversities claims against non-licensed users). 
222 See 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1234–37. 
223 See id.; see also Grady & McKelvey, supra note 34, at 237–38 (discussing the Sinks case 
and its application to collegiate licensing doctrine). 
224 See Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1265–69
s were available to summary judgment on infringement and the rest were a question of 
a material fact for a lower court to decide). 
225 See Gra
ly a step back for collegiate licensing rights and put parties on more level footing with 
each other). 
226 See Halley, supra note 9 (noting at least five recent high-profile disputes between 
colleges and high schools). 
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opinion suggest that collegiate institutions may be asserting their 
trademark rights too broadly.227 Applying the Polaroid factors to a po-
tential infringement suit shows that a high school might be the best po-
sitioned defendant to challenge the expanding trademark rights of 
uni s
V
options, and why a high school could and 
possibly should use the first two options to improve their bargaining 
position for the third.234 
the offending mark, regardless of the merits.235 In fact, in virtually 
                                                                                                                     
ver ities, both through law and public perception.228 
. Leveling the Playing Field, Allowing High Schools an 
Equitable Solution 
 Even though high schools might be the best suited to stop the “ac-
cretion” of college trademark rights, universities still have valid reasons 
to protect their intellectual property.229 If they allow high schools and 
other entities to widely use logos and other symbols too similar to their 
own, collegiate institutions risk diluting the identity of their marks, al-
lowing abandonment claims, and potentially even subjecting them-
selves to reverse-confusion claims.230 Therein lies the crux of the prob-
lem: a university with something to gain is better positioned to fight a 
lawsuit than a high school that can only lose.231 Nevertheless, as dis-
cussed previously, high schools are not without options.232 Upon receiv-
ing a C&D letter, a high school has three options: (1) change the con-
tested mark, (2) fight the lawsuit, or (3) settle with the university.233 
This Part discusses all three 
A. Changing the Mark 
 The quickest way to end a trademark dispute is simply to change 
 
See supra notes 157–228 and accompanying text; see also Gibson, supra note 15, at 
907– a result of consumer percep-
tion
ial risks for high schools in using 
mar emark law). 
 University of Wisconsin). 
227 See Grinvald, supra note 17, at 643 (discussing the unreasonable interpretation of 
trademark rights by bigger corporations against third parties). 
228 See supra notes 169–227 and accompanying text (analyzing a high school defendant 
under the likelihood of confusion factors laid out in Polaroid). 
229 
27 (discussing the accretion of rights in trademark law as 
). 
230 See supra notes 25–86, 87–123 and accompanying text. 
231 See Read, supra note 13 (discussing the potent
ks that universities claim are protected by federal trad
232 See infra notes 235–273 and accompanying text. 
233 See infra notes 235–273 and accompanying text. 
234 See infra notes 235–273 and accompanying text. 
235 See, e.g., Abrahams, supra note 12 (reporting that Woodlands High School changed 
their logo to avoid further action from the
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every C&D letter, there is a request for the recipient to do so.236 That 
request, though easy for a university to make, is harder for a high 
ho
eir own logos and symbols and 
art
g that can be truly gained by changing the mark is cost-
rta
                                                                                                                     
sc ol to accommodate.237 
 The monetary cost of changing a school’s logos is high, potentially 
costing as much as 60,000 dollars just to change athletic uniforms and 
gym floors.238 Additionally, changing a high school’s logo is a logistical 
nightmare—not to mention the emotional impact that switching logos 
has on a school.239 Just like universities, high schools have built up their 
own goodwill in their logos, a fact best illustrated by the fact that many 
high schools have begun to trademark th
st ed their own licensing programs.240 
 Furthermore, many high schools question the principles of allow-
ing a bigger institution to change the way they operate.241 Given these 
concerns and the monetary costs of changing a logo, except in cases in 
which there is an obvious theft of intellectual property, a high school 
will likely be better off standing their ground at the outset.242 In fact, 
the only thin
ce inty.243 
 Conversely, by refusing to initially change the mark, a high school 
forces a collegiate institution to make a choice to pursue the claim, 
 
-
 
are that the Lake Mary High School 
was
stimating that it will cost Glades Day High School 60,000 dollars to 
pha
report-
ing t High 
Sch
236 See Iowa Letter, supra note 6 (requesting that the high school immediately discon-
tinue use of the university’s trademarks). 
237 See Dave Weber, Chrysler Softens Stance on Lake Mary High’s Ram Jam, Orlando Sen
tinel Educ. Blog (Mar. 9, 2010), http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/news_education_
edblog/2010/03/chrysler-softens-stand-on-lake-mary-highs-ram-jam.html?utm_source=feed 
burner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+SentinelSchoolZone+%28Sentinel 
+School+Zone%29 (discussing the logistical nightm
 facing in changing its logo and removing all traces of Rams heads that Chrysler claims 
were infringing upon their trademarked property). 
238 See Block Interview, supra note 11 (estimating the cost to the school of removing the 
disputed mark solely from the basketball gymnasium floor at 15,000 dollars); see also Hal-
ley, supra note 9 (e
se out their athletic uniforms over the next five years after a request made by the Uni-
versity of Florida). 
239 See Abrahams, supra note 12 (discussing the negative emotional impact on students 
that changing the Woodlands High School logo has had). 
240 See Halley, supra note 9 (reporting that high schools are starting to register their 
own logos and mascots to protect their rights to those items). 
241 See Stockton, supra note 89 (reporting that Southeast High School refused to settle 
with Florida State University in part because of the way the case had been handled). 
242 See id.; see also Halle Stockton, FSU: Southeast High School Can Use Seminoles Logo, Sara-
sota Herald-Trib. (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20101112/ 
BREAKING/101119916/-1/sports?Title=FSU-Southeast-High-can-use-Seminoles-logo (
that Florida State University eventually came to favorable terms with Southeas
ool as a result of their refusal to settle with the university at the outset). 
243 See Block Interview, supra note 11 (discussing fixed costs of changing logos). 
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drop the claim, or negotiate.244 If the university chooses to move for-
ward—sometimes a move they are contractually obligated to make— 
high schools might benefit both as individual entities and as a collective 
whole.245 Acting individually, the negative press associated with many of 
these cases benefits the bargaining position of the high school; the last 
thing a collegiate institution wants is drawn-out media coverage of a 
dispute.246 Collectively, the negative press informs the public, including 
other high schools, and helps to halt the accretion of trademark rights 
based solely on public perception by challenging that perception.247 
 individually, a school is 
rce
B. Fighting the Lawsuit 
 As discussed in Part IV, high schools present many potential obsta-
cles for collegiate institutions asserting their trademark rights.248 Apply-
ing the different factors courts use in a likelihood of confusion case, a 
high school has a significant chance of success.249 In spite of this poten-
tial success, the problem high schools face is their inherent risk aver-
sion and their budget constraints, and by acting
fo d to think not of success but of survival.250 
 One potential strategy is for high schools to act collectively and 
form a joint-defense fund.251 For instance, if the forty schools the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin sent C&D letters to each contributed 2500 dollars, 
                                                                                                                      
244See Stockton, supra note 242 (reporting that Florida State University, after insisting 
that
, supra note 50, at 80–87 (discussing the contractual agreements be-
twee
pute was a public 
rela
enblatt, supra note 91, at 1058 (ar-
guin
anying text. 
, Frommeyer.com, http:// 
www
ndependently). 
 Southeast High School cease and desist from using claimed marks of the university, 
eventually settled and allowed the high school to continue to use the nickname and other 
marks associated with Florida State University as an official licensee). 
245 See Lattinville
n collegiate institutions and licensing agents); see also Gibson, supra note 15, at 907–27 
(arguing that individual risk aversion leads to a presumption of a licensing right for 
trademark owners). 
246 See Editorial, Seminole Settlement, Sarasota Herald-Trib., Sept. 3, 2010, at A12 (ar-
guing that the entire Southeast High School-Florida State University dis
tions nightmare for the university). 
247 See Gibson, supra note 15, at 907–27; see also Ros
g for a change to the license-don’t-litigate culture that has formed). 
248 See supra notes 157–228 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 157–213 and accomp
250 See Gibson, supra note 15, at 912 (arguing that trademark law and consumer per-
ception lend themselves to circular reasoning that ends with non-licensed users applying 
for licenses even when none is necessary). 
251 See Anna Wolfe, On-line Retailers Sued for Patent Infringement
.frommeyer.com/news-08.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (reporting that a group of 
nearly fifty on-line retailers banded together to fight a frivolous trademark lawsuit aimed at 
small businesses who could not afford to litigate i
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a 100,000 dollar legal fund could be established to fight such a suit.252 
Under this scenario, the fund could choose the high school that they 
feel most confident would win (e.g., the school that is the farthest away, 
with the most different color schemes, the longest use, etc.) and sup-
port that school as the test case.253 A victory for just one of the high 
schools would likely cause other universities to reexamine whether this 
practice is worth the potential cost.254 If Wisconsin chose to bring all 
forty into court, a public relations nightmare for a university, then the 
high schools could join their suits together and improve the bargaining 
osi
 as an impetus 
for collegiate institutions to negotiate or settle as well.258 
                                                                                                                     
p tion of the entire group.255 
 Even in the worst-case scenario of a loss, whether collectively or as 
individual entities, it is hard to imagine how the university could receive 
anything more than an injunction against high schools’ use of the 
marks.256 Proving damages might actually be the toughest, and most 
costly, part of a lawsuit for a university.257 This fact serves
C. An Equitable Settlement 
 The most obvious solution is a settlement.259 Thus far, in college-
high school trademark disputes, no case has gone to trial, and for obvi-
ous reasons, there has yet to be a widely reported instance of a college 
backing away from a C&D letter.260 Yet, with that in mind, not all set-
tlements are created equal.261 High schools are best served by request-
 
252 See Abrahams, supra note 12 (reporting that the University of Wisconsin sent 40 
C&D
o have exclusive trademark rights too). 
Professor Alfred Yen, Bos. Coll. Law Sch., in Bos., Mass. ( Jan. 17, 
201
 nightmare 
that coverage). 
86 and accompanying text. 
l for CLC who stated that “it 
has ed the point where there has been any litigation” because thus far every re-
por
 have been agreed to). 
 letters to schools in 26 states asking them to change the “motion W” that Wisconsin 
claims t
253 Interview with 
1). 
254 See id. 
255 See Seminole Settlement, supra note 246 (addressing the public relations
 these cases have become due to increased media 
256 See supra notes 25–86 and accompanying text (discussing actual harm). 
257 See supra notes 25–
258 See infra notes 259–273 and accompanying text (encouraging settlements of high 
school-college disputes). 
259 See Abrahams, supra note 12 (quoting assistant counse
 not reach
ted dispute has eventually settled before going to court). 
260 See id. 
261 See id. (highlighting five different settlements); see also Read, supra note 13 (noting 
the different settlements that
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in ettlements and using the strategies previously outlined to receive 
settlements that affect their own institutions the least.
g s
yments for li-
ns
unt con-
er
                                                                                                                     
262 
 Examples of settlements can range from phasing-out plans to li-
censes that cost high schools as little as one dollar.263 The problem is 
that universities vary in what they determine to be an acceptable set-
tlement.264 Although some schools like Georgia Tech have allowed 
high school licensees the use of their trademarked rights for as little as 
two dollars for every four years, other schools like the University of Mis-
souri refuse to deal with outside licensees.265 Some schools like Kansas 
State charge different schools different amounts for nominal li-
censes.266 The problem with such a setup is that if a university is so con-
cerned with potential legal issues, requiring different pa
ce es leaves an institution open to other potential legal claims and 
offers a higher risk that these licenses could eventually be chal-
lenged.267 
 A better solution is a uniform settlement that can govern all high 
school-college trademark disputes.268 This type of settlement should 
govern what uses the licensed marks can be used for, the term of the 
license, the parameters for renewing such a license, and the cost of that 
license.269 Given the range of settlements used in these disputes today, 
this author recommends that it would be in the best interests of both 
parties to charge one hundred dollars a year, or a similar amo
sid ed valuable consideration, for a five-year term, automatically re-
newed except for a breach of agreement by either party, used only for 
the purposes of promoting the high school and its students.270 
 For universities, a uniform settlement will likely provide little in 
terms of monetary gain, but it will prevent public relations nightmares, 
directly resolve the fear of losing trademark control, and even avoid po-
 
ols can use to gain a 
bett
iscussing general settlements). 
 losing control of trademarks and al-
so of
 settle-
men
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262 See supra notes 235–258 (discussing different options high scho
er bargaining position). 
263 See Abrahams, supra note 12 (d
264 See id.; see also Read, supra note 13. 
265 See Abrahams, supra note 12. 
266 See id.; see also Halley, supra note 9. 
267 See Iowa Letter, supra note 6 (noting the fear of
 losing a potential cause of action under federal dilution protection). 
268 See infra notes 269–70 and accompanying text. 
269 See Read, supra note 13, at 12; Abrahams, supra note 12; Seminole War, supra note 2, 
at A12 (reporting on different settlements and the general terms of those agreements). 
270 See Read, supra note 13; Abrahams, supra note 12; Seminole War, supra note 2, at A12 
(noting different settlement packages). This Note combines previously reported
ts and makes recommendations based on common terms of settlements that would be 
considered moderate when looking at the best and worst settlements for each si
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tentially negative lawsuits.271 For high schools, the cost and legal cer-
tainty of such a settlement should trump other concerns, as the practical 
effects of such an agreement would operate almost exactly as a court-
room victory would.272 Although settlements that make high schools 
official licensees of collegiate institutions would help to maintain the 
perception that licensing is the collegiate institutions’ exclusive right 
and therefore the market norm, a nominal license recognizes the im-
portance of both brands, th  and the colleges’, without 
efendant could test the ceiling. Looking at how courts 
ave
bar-
e high schools’
significantly impacting the rights of either.273 
Conclusion 
 Although trademark rights of owners have expanded over the past 
quarter-century, it is unclear whether collegiate institutions have a le-
gitimate trademark claim against a high school using a similar name, 
logo, or mascot. Statutory protection and case law have yet to put a true 
cap on collegiate institutions’ trademark rights, and it appears that a 
high school d
h  applied the Polaroid factors in trademark infringement cases, col-
legiate institutions could be asserting their rights too broadly against 
high schools. 
 Consequently, without a court verdict that definitely establishes the 
outer boundaries of trademark protection for collegiate institutions, 
most high schools continue to accept these assertions that they are in-
fringers. This acceptance, bolstered by the lack of negative case law, has 
led to a presumption by both sides of strong collegiate trademark 
rights. The resulting effect is that when receiving a C&D from a colle-
giate institution, high schools are placed in a significantly worse 
gaining position. Due to that belief, the cost uncertainty of litigation, 
and the finality of a settlement, even high schools with the strongest 
defenses usually opt to settle at the mercy of the bigger institution. 
 Nevertheless, as Southeast High School proved in their dispute 
with Florida State University, high schools do not have to blindly accept 
the trademark assertions of an institution with deeper pockets. Instead, 
by asserting their own rights and using negative press along with a col-
                                                                                                                      
271 See Seminole Settlement, supra note 246, at A12 (“nightmare”); see also Weber, supra 
note 237 (describing Chrysler’s softened stance as a result of public backlash). 
272 See Seminole Settlement, supra note 246, at A12 (describing the rationale behind the 
settlement between Southeast and Florida State and the fact that Southeast still believes 
they hold the right to use the logos at dispute despite settling as a licensee). 
273 See Gibson, supra note 15, at 907–27 (discussing the accretion of rights because of 
the assumption of licensing). 
2011] Equitable Solution to College-High School Trademark Disputes 1869 
ating table with more equal foot-
g. 
at allows 
high schools to keep their logos for a small fee a
the universities. This arrangement would allow 
their identities, while legally protecting both sides and keeping these 
disputes from casting a negative shadow on either institution. 
Randall L. Newsom 
legiate institution’s fear of a negative verdict, high schools can even the 
playing field and come to the negoti
in Such a stance also serves to end the presumption-of-rights cycle by 
notifying both colleges and high schools that the bigger school does 
not have carte blanche to assert trademark rights against every high 
school with a similar logo or mascot. 
 Ultimately, the parties on both sides of these disputes have a lot to 
lose. Collegiate institutions need the ability to protect their trademarks 
against legitimate infringers without the fear of that infringer pointing 
to deals universities’ have made with high schools. They also want to 
avoid looking like a “trademark bully” against a sympathetic defendant. 
Likewise, high schools do not have the time, money, or other resources 
available to deal with litigation, and changing a school’s mascot or logo 
can have a profound impact on that community. In the end, a better 
practice would be to follow a uniform settlement agreement th
s official licensees of 
both parties to keep 
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